Contracting in ocean transportation with empty container repositioning under asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The container shipping network design problem with empty container repositioning
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review
سال: 2021
ISSN: 1366-5545
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102173