Contracting, Imperfect Information, and the Food System
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contracting for Information under Imperfect Commitment
We study optimal contracting under imperfect commitment in a model with an uninformed principal and an informed agent. The principal can commit to pay the agent for his advice but retains decision-making authority. Under an optimal contract, the principal should (a) never induce the agent to fully reveal what he knows even though this is feasible and (b) never pay the agent for imprecise info...
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We develop a dynamic principal–agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs, asymmetric risk attitudes, complementary actions by both parties, and inter-temporal adverse selection arising from the agent’s unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts. Our continuous-time formulation of the model, which features both “hidden actions” and “hidden...
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This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature’s common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In addition, general communication devices solve two fundamental problems of contracting with imperfect com...
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Standard work on costly state verification, monitoring, and auditing generally assumes perfect signals about the underlying state, especially in questions about financial contracting. Relaxing that assumption has several intriguing consequences. Most imperfect audits turn out to be useless, and those that are useful cannot be ranked by conventional criteria such as Blackwell's information measu...
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A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that in multistage “games,” players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being “tough” or “benevolent” or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten’s finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated priso...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
سال: 1996
ISSN: 2040-5790,2040-5804
DOI: 10.2307/1349662