Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implications of Renegotiation for Optimal Contract Flexibility and Investment
I a stylized model of biopharmaceutical contract manufacturing, this paper shows how the potential for renegotiation influences the optimal structure of supply contracts, investments in innovation and capacity, the way scarce capacity is allocated, and firms’ resulting profits. Two buyers contract for capacity with a common manufacturer. Then, the buyers invest in innovation (product developmen...
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A debt contract usually does not include a provision about renegotiation. The right to seize the borrower’s asset and the rules of this process are usually stipulated in the contract. Such a promise not to renegotiate is not credible since renegotiation can mitigate the dead-weight loss of liquidating insolvent borrowers. Once the initial contract may not consider the renegotiation procedure an...
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15 صفحه اولRenegotiation and the Dynamics of Contract Design
Besides sunk costs and reputation, long-term contracts are an important form of commitment. In fact, in the imaginary world of Arrow-Debreu there is no room for other forms of commitment than the fully contingent longterm contract. At the risk of oversimplification, one could describe a large part of the theoretical research effort of the past three decades as a systematic attempt at understand...
متن کاملContract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems
This article discusses the ability of an agent and a principal to achieve the first-best outcome when the agent invests in an asset that has greater value if owned by the principal than by the agent. When contracts can be renegotiated, a well-known danger is that the principal can hold up the agent, undermining the agent’s investment incentives. We begin by identifying a countervailing effect: ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Canadian Journal of Economics
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0008-4085
DOI: 10.2307/136034