Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue‐Sharing Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contracts, Fairness, and Incentives
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...
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We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But trust contracts that pay a generous w...
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According to a composite of several well-esteemed English dictionary definitions, the word context has two primary meanings. Most basically, it is defined from a linguistic viewpoint as “a group of words of interest that either precede or follow another word or passage, usually influencing its meaning or effect.” (Aside: In linguistic semantics, the phenomenon that the interpretation of an expr...
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Suppose Alice and Bob are two entities (e.g. agents, organizations, etc.) that wish to negotiate a contract. A contract consists of several clauses, and each party has certain constraints on the acceptability and desirability (i.e., a private “utility” function) of each clause. If Bob were to reveal his constraints to Alice in order to find an agreement, then she would learn an unacceptable amo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0347-0520,1467-9442
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12200