Continuously stable strategies as evolutionary branching points
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Continuously stable strategies as evolutionary branching points.
Evolutionary branching points are a paradigmatic feature of adaptive dynamics, because they are potential starting points for adaptive diversification. The antithesis to evolutionary branching points are continuously stable strategies (CSS's), which are convergent stable and evolutionarily stable equilibrium points of the adaptive dynamics and hence are thought to represent endpoints of adaptiv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Theoretical Biology
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-5193
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.06.036