منابع مشابه
Continuous-time games of timing
We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect e-equilibrium, for each e40: This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established. r 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. J...
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Let (X,Y, Z) be a triple of payoff processes defining a Dynkin game R̃(σ, τ) = E [ Xσ1{τ>σ} + Yτ1{τ<σ} + Zτ1{τ=σ} ] , where σ and τ are stopping times valued in [0, T ]. In the case Z = Y , it is well known that the condition X ≤ Y is needed in order to establish the existence of value for the game, i.e., infτ supσ R̃(σ, τ) = supσ infτ R̃(σ, τ). In order to remove the condition X ≤ Y , we introduc...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001