منابع مشابه
Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences
We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. ...
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We present a simple and natural non-pricing mechanism for allocating divisible goods among strategic agents having lexicographic preferences. Our mechanism has favorable properties of strategy-proofness (incentive compatibility). In addition (and even when extended to the case of Leontief bundles) it enjoys Pareto efficiency, envy-freeness, and time efficiency. 1998 ACM Subject Classification F...
متن کاملMulti-Objective POMDPs with Lexicographic Reward Preferences
We propose a model, Lexicographic Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (LPOMDP), which extends POMDPs with lexicographic preferences over multiple value functions. It allows for slack–slightly less-than-optimal values–for higherpriority preferences to facilitate improvement in lower-priority value functions. Many real life situations are naturally captured by LPOMDPs with slack. We cons...
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In a service-oriented environment, clients can usually choose between several web services offering the same functionality. The web service selection can be automated by allowing clients to specify nonfunctional requirements such as quality of service. Clients should also be able to indicate how to make tradeoffs when some of these requirements cannot be met. The ability to capture tradeoff pre...
متن کاملNash Equilibria in Concurrent Games with Lexicographic Preferences
We study concurrent games with finite-memory strategies where players are given a Büchi and a mean-payoff objective, which are related by a lexicographic order: a player first prefers to satisfy its Büchi objective, and then prefers to minimise costs, which are given by a mean-payoff function. In particular, we show that deciding the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium in such games is decid...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.07.001