Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Continuity in Mechanism Design without Transfers
We adopt a mechanism design approach to model communication between a principal and a privately informed agent in the context where monetary incentives are not available. We provide a simple condition on the distribution of the agent’s type which ensures that the optimal mechanism is continuous. With strict log-concavity of the distribution, there exists a unique optimal mechanism that is chara...
متن کاملDynamic Mechanism Design Without Transfers: Promises and Confidentiality
This paper considers mechanisms for truthful revelation in a dynamic setting where each agent privately observes the expected value of his option, only a single option can be selected each period, and each agent receives a payoff that depends on the type of the selected option. To incentivize the agents to report their private information honestly, the principal trades off a higher likelihood o...
متن کاملOptimal allocation design without transfers PRELIMINARY DRAFT
This paper studies the allocation of goods to agents without monetary transfers and incomplete information. Agents’ have private, multi-dimensional utilities over goods, drawn from commonly known priors, possibly asymmetric across agents’ types. Both cardinal and ordinal mechanisms are studied. For tractability, a large market approximation is considered with a continuum of agents for each type...
متن کاملMechanism Design without Quasilinearity
This paper studies a model of mechanism design when agents’ preferences over transfers need not be quasilinear. In a general model of non-quasilinearity, we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property. We also establish a revenue uniqueness result: for every dominant strategy implementable allocation rule, there is a unique payment rule that can ...
متن کاملMechanism design without commitment ∗ , †
This paper identifies mechanisms that are implementable even when the planner cannot commit to the rules of the mechanism. The standard approach is to require mechanism to be robust against redesign. This often leads nonexistence of acceptable mechanisms. The novelty of this paper to require robustness against redesigns that are themselves robust against redesigns that are themselves robust aga...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.011