منابع مشابه
Bargaining with endogenous deadlines
We develop a two-person negotiation model with complete information that makes endogenous both the deadline and the level of surplus destruction after the deadline. We show that the undominated Nash equilibrium outcome is always unique but might be inefficient. Moreover, as the bargaining period becomes short or as the players become very patient, the unique undominated Nash equilibrium outcome...
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We report the results of laboratory experiments on rent-seeking contests with endogenous participation. Theory predicts that (a) contest entry and rent-seeking expenditures increase with the size of the prize; and (b) earnings are equalized between the contest and the outside option. While the directional predictions offered in (a) are supported in the data, the level predictions are not. Predi...
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Lobbyists choose what to lobby for. If they can precommit to certain policy proposals, their choice will have an inuence on the behavior of opposing lobbyists. Hence lobbyists have an incentive to moderate their policy proposals in order to reduce the intensity of the lobbying contest. This logic has been explored in a number of recent papers. I reconsider the topic with a perfectly discrimina...
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In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of agents. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number of age...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12228