Contests between Players with Mean-Variance Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Subjective mean-variance preferences without expected utility
Classical derivations of mean variance preferences have all relied upon the expected utility hypothesis. Some widespread experimental studies have uncovered that the expected utility model tends to be systematically violated in practice. Such findings would lead people to doubt the empirical relevance of the literature and the practical effectiveness of the portfolio selection which employ the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2143008