Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods

Public Supply of Private Goods

Public Provision of Private Goods

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On the Private Provision of Public Goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the ...

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate the private provision of a discrete public good. When the size and decomposition of the group are certain, such a problem has, in general, multiple equilibria. Yet, if it is commonly believed that some individuals may be altruists and that the size of the group is a Poisson random variable then equilibrium is unique. If the decomposition uncertainty is very small and the expected...

Comparing the effect of religiosity on public goods production and natural resource conservation: a experimental study

In this research, the effect of religiosity on participation in the production of public goods and preservation of natural resources has been investigated. Extraction of participation data and conservation of natural resource has been done through the implementation of online laboratory of public goods and natural resource games. To extract the three dimensions of religiosity (belief, rituals a...