Contests: A Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Unique Existence of Pure - Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Smooth Asymmetric Contests
There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent-seeking contest. First, the efectiveness of agent's efort on the winning probabilities may difer among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent-seeking contest diferently. Thirdly, players may face diferent financial constraints. Without assuming that each player’s production function for loteries is ...
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1 Randomized Strategies or Mixed Strategies Consider a strategic form game: Γ = 〈N, (Si), (ui)〉. The elements of Si are called pure strategies of player i (i = 1, . . . , n). If player i chooses a strategy in Si according to a probability distribution, we have a mixed strategy or a randomized strategy. In the discussion that follows, we assume that Si is a finite for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. D...
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The authors present a simple and effective method for improving student comprehension of mixed strategies. After reviewing available texts, and with some trial and error, we feel that this method eases the teaching of the information and increases the students’ ability to understand and retain concepts.Through a simple alteration to the normal form of a game, students can clearly see the result...
متن کاملEquilibrium learning in simple contests
The paper studies a repeated contest when contestants are uncertain about their true relative abilities. When ability and effort are complements, a favorable belief about one’s own ability stimulates effort and increases the likelihood of success. Success, in turn, reinforces favorable beliefs. We show that this implies that with positive probability players fail to learn their true relative ab...
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We consider a general class of imperfectly discriminating contests with privately informed players. We show that findings by Athey (2001) imply the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in monotone pure strategies. JEL classification: D72, D74, D82, C72
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.288810