Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contest functions: Theoretical foundations and issues in estimation
Contest functions (alternatively, contest success functions) determine probabilities of winning and losing as a function of contestants e¤ort. They are used widely in many areas of economics that employ contest games, from tournaments and rent-seeking to conict and sports. We rst examine the theoretical foundations of contest functions and classify them into four types of derivation: stochas...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.06.007