Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of widely studied maximizing total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a player's output if player very low or high. model this using two functions: binary threshold, contribution to 1 her above certain and 0 otherwise; linear between lower upper becomes constant below threshold. For both these objectives, we (1) rank-order allocation that use only ranking players assign prizes (2) general may numerical values players' outputs prizes. characterize optimal maximize indicate techniques efficiently compute them. also prove for threshold objective, contest distributes prize equally among fixed number top-ranked offers factor-2 approximation contest.
منابع مشابه
Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation
This paper experimentally compares the performance of four simultaneous lottery contests: a grand contest, two multiple prize settings (equal and unequal prizes), and a contest which consists of two subcontests. Consistent with the theory, the grand contest generates the highest effort levels among all simultaneous contests. In multi-prize settings, equal prizes produce lower efforts than unequ...
متن کاملPrize and Punishment: Optimal Contest Design with Incomplete Information∗
This paper studies the optimal contest design problem when the abilities of the risk neutral contestants are independent private information. The contest designer has a fixed prize budget to elicit efforts from the contestants. We consider all possible mechanisms that allocate prizes and punishments (negative prizes) across the contestants. We find that an optimal contest mechanism does not exi...
متن کاملSocial Loss Aversion and Optimal Contest Design
When designing a contest to motivate effort by salespeople, service employees, franchisees or product development teams, one of the key questions faced by managers is: What should be the optimal proportion of winners and losers? Prevailing marketing theory predicts that the proportion of winners in a contest should always be lower than the proportion of losers. Not only has this theory not been...
متن کاملContest Design with Uncertain Performance and Costly Participation
This paper studies the problem of designing contests for settings where a principal seeks to optimize the quality of the best contribution obtained, and potential contestants only strategize about whether to participate in the contest, as participation incurs some cost. This type of contest can be mapped to various real-life settings (e.g., selection of background actors based on headshots, pho...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4155267