Contentious politics in environmental assessment: blocked projects and winning coalitions

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal

سال: 2008

ISSN: 1461-5517,1471-5465

DOI: 10.3152/146155108x279939