Construction Engineering Project Phase Hidden Costs of Control Strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
The Hidden Costs of Control
We analyze the consequences of control on motivation in an experimental principalagent game, where the principal can control the agent by implementing a minimum performance requirement before the agent chooses a productive activity. Our results show that control entails hidden costs since most agents reduce their performance as a response to the principals controlling decision. Overall, the eff...
متن کاملJ Control of Construction Costs during Construction
Title of Thesis: Control of Construction Costs During Construction David H. Foo, Master of Science in Management Engineering, 1981 Thesis directed by: Dr. John M. Ciborski, Special Lecturer The construction of a major project requires a vast amount of time, money, material and human resources. Proper coordination of these elements into an array of activities is crutial to the success of the pro...
متن کاملLife cycle assessment of construction phase of monorail project in Qom, Iran
Transportation is an important part of modern community life as well as one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions in urban communities, the population growth of which can increase transportation capacity. Monorail systems are relatively new rail transportation systems which are currently being designed and constructed in different countries. We have applied the Intergovernmental Pa...
متن کاملLife cycle assessment of construction phase of monorail project in Qom, Iran
Transportation is an important part of modern community life as well as one of the largest sources of greenhouse gas emissions in urban communities, the population growth of which can increase transportation capacity. Monorail systems are relatively new rail transportation systems which are currently being designed and constructed in different countries. We have applied the Intergovernmental Pa...
متن کاملIntention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Empirical research suggests that rather than improving incentives exerting control can reduce workers’ performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, beca...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: OALib
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2333-9721,2333-9705
DOI: 10.4236/oalib.1105682