Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation.
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring a...
متن کاملFree-riding and cooperation in environmental games
This paper examines the negotiation of an international environmental agreement in which di¤erent countries determine the (nonenforceable) promises of investment in clean technologies to be included in the agreement. Furthermore, it analyzes countries optimal investments in clean technologies, considering that, in addition to the utility that countries perceive from an improved environmental q...
متن کاملEmergence of cooperation in public goods games.
Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the 'cooperative' equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the ...
متن کاملResistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lea...
متن کاملEcological public goods games: cooperation and bifurcation.
The Public Goods Game is one of the most popular models for studying the origin and maintenance of cooperation. In its simplest form, this evolutionary game has two regimes: defection goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is smaller than the interaction group size N, whereas cooperation goes to fixation if the multiplication factor r is larger than the interaction group size N. Hauert...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0962-8452,1471-2954
DOI: 10.1098/rspb.2008.1082