Constrained Efficient Borrowing with Sovereign Default Risk
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IMF Working Papers
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1018-5941
DOI: 10.5089/9781513560366.001