Constant Price of Anarchy in Network-Creation Games via Public-Service Advertising
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constant Price of Anarchy in Network Creation Games via Public Service Advertising
Network creation games have been studied in many different settings recently. These games are motivated by social networks in which selfish agents want to construct a connection graph among themselves. Each node wants to minimize its average or maximum distance to the others, without paying much to construct the network. Many generalizations have been considered, including non-uniform interests...
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We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the classical model of Network Creation Games introduced by Fabrikant et al. In this model every agent (node) buys links at a prefixed price $\alpha>0$ in order to get connected to the network formed by all the $n$ agents. In this setting, the reformulated tree conjecture states that for $\alpha>n$, every Nash equilibrium network is a tree. S...
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We consider a class of networks where n agents need to send their traffic from a given source to a given destination over m identical, non-intersecting, and parallel links. For such networks, our interest is in computing the worst case loss in social welfare when a distributed routing scheme is used instead of a centralized one. For this, we use a noncooperative game model with price of anarchy...
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There has been recent interest in showing that real networks, designed via optimization [7], may possess topological properties similar to those investigated by the Network Science community [2], [17], [6], [1]. This suggests that the Network Science community’s view that topological properties such as scale-freeness are not the result of some immutable physical laws, but in fact intentional op...
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Network creation games model the creation and usage costs of networks formed by n selfish nodes. Each node v can buy a set of edges, each for a fixed price α > 0. Its goal is to minimize its private costs, i.e., the sum (SUM-game, Fabrikant et al., PODC 2003) or maximum (MAX-game, Demaine et al., PODC 2007) of distances from v to all other nodes plus the prices of the bought edges. The above pa...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Internet Mathematics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1542-7951,1944-9488
DOI: 10.1080/15427951.2012.625251