Consistent approval-based multi-winner rules

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper is an axiomatic study of consistent approval-based committee (ABC) rules. These are multi-winner voting rules that select a committee, i.e., fixed-size group candidates, based on approval ballots. We introduce the class ABC scoring and provide characterization this consistency axiom. Building upon result, we axiomatically characterize three important rules: Proportional Approval Voting, Multi-Winner Voting Chamberlin–Courant rule. Our results demonstrate variety illustrate different, orthogonal principles may represent: proportionality, diversity, individual excellence.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105173