Conservative belief and rationality

Conservative belief and rationality

Players’ beliefs may be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0. One way to block incompatibility is to assume a common prior. We consider here a different approach: we require players’ beliefs to be conservative, in the sense that all players must ascribe the actual world positive probability. We show that common c...

Rationality, Belief and Commitment

Justified Belief and Rationality

Brandenburger and Dekel have shown that common belief of rationality (CBR) characterizes rationalizable strategies, which are also characterized by a refinement of subjective correlated equilibrium called a posteriori equilibrium. It is possible that players’ beliefs might be incompatible, in the sense that player i can assign probability 1 to an event E to which player j assigns probability 0....

Belief and Bounded Rationality

Since Quine’s Word and Object [Qui60], there has been more-or-less general agreement on the correct treatment on the status of talk about intentional attitudes. In a strict ontological sense, “the canonical scheme for us is the austere scheme” according to which there are “no propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behaviour of organisms” [Qui60, p. 221]. However, intenti...

Rationality of Belief Or :

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a “Grand State Space”, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational be...