Conservation accord: Corporate incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Directors' Incentives and Corporate Performance
We examine the effect of the incentives of the members of the board of directors on shareholder wealth, CEO compensation and the sensitivity of this compensation to corporate performance in laboratory setting. Two methods of appointing the board, one by the CEO and the other by the largest shareholder, constitute the main treatment. The board sets the compensation for the CEO, who makes product...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0036-8075,1095-9203
DOI: 10.1126/science.aau0788