Consequences of voting when no vote is decisive
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?
Researchers sometimes argue that statisticians have little to contribute when few realizations of the process being estimated are observed. We show that this argument is incorrect even in the extreme situation of estimating the probabilities of events so rare that they have never occurred. We show how statistical forecasting models allow us to use empirical data to improve inferences about the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cuadernos Económicos de ICE
سال: 2013
ISSN: 2340-9037,0210-2633
DOI: 10.32796/cice.2013.85.6049