Consensus Game Acceptors and Iterated Transductions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Consensus Game Acceptors and Iterated Transductions
We study a game for recognising formal languages, in which two players with imperfect information need to coordinate on a common decision, given private input words correlated by a finite graph. The players have a joint objective to avoid an inadmissible decision, in spite of the uncertainty induced by the input. We show that the acceptor model based on consensus games characterises context-sen...
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We propose a game for recognising formal languages, in which two players with imperfect information need to coordinate on a common decision, given private input information. The players have a joint objective to avoid an inadmissible decision, in spite of the uncertainty induced by the input. We show that this model of consensus acceptor games characterises context-sensitive languages, and conv...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0129-0541,1793-6373
DOI: 10.1142/s0129054118400026