Consciousness and Categorical Properties

Russellian physicalism is a view on the nature of consciousness which promises to satisfy demands both traditional physicalists and non-physicalists. It does so by identifying subjective experience with physically acceptable categorical properties underlying structural dispositional described science. Though promising, faces at least two serious challenges: (i) it has been argued that science deals in non-categorical properties, would undercut motivation behind physicalism, (ii) only nonphysicalist views—like panpsychism—are useful when comes explaining consciousness. I address these criticisms, arguing there no viable reason for maintaining sort physicalist interested in, features fully-physical can be provide explanations various essential experience. These projects are connected: turns out explanatory relevance explained detail, constraints put say left Specifically, forced subscribe leaves any whatsoever, as opposed some scientifically scrutable categorical, but not ones in. hope addressing criticisms drawing logical connections between responses, further appeal added far relatively unexplored, view.