Congress as manager: oversight hearings and agency morale
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Policy
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0143-814X,1469-7815
DOI: 10.1017/s0143814x15000367