Congestion Pricing and Noncooperative Games in Communication Networks

Congestion Pricing and Noncooperative Games in Communication Networks

We consider congestion pricing as a mechanism for sharing bandwidth in communication networks, and model the interaction among the users as a game. We propose a decentralized algorithm for the users that is based on the history of the price process, where user response to congestion prices is analogous to “fictitious play” in game theory, and show that this results in convergence to the unique ...

Bottleneck Games in Noncooperative Networks

We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, each associated with a positive flow demand, and a load-dependent performance function for each network element. We first prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium, considering two routing scenarios, namely when a user can ...

On congestion pricing Stackelberg games in dynamic traffic networks

Incentive-Compatible Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks

The complexity of modern networks calls for decentralized control schemes where each user makes its control decisions independently based on some individual performance objectives. The operating points of such noncooperative networks are the Nash equilibria of the underlying control game. Nash equilibria are generically inefficient and lead to suboptimal network performance. Using routing as a ...

Congestion Pricing: Paying Your Way in Communication Networks

N etwork congestion is a fundamental problem facing Internet users today. Many common complaints — “Why is this streaming video clip so jerky?” “Why are these Web pages taking so long to download compared to yesterday?” and “Why are my pings so high in Quake?” — usually reflect congestion somewhere in the network. Traditional approaches to congestion control have viewed the Internet as a cooper...