Conformity, Information and Truthful Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Mediators and Truthful Voting
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem asserts the impossibility of designing a non-dictatorial social choice function (SCF) under which agents can never benefit by lying, assuming complete information. We show that in voting games of complete information where a mediator is on hand, the implications of this troubling impossibility result can be alleviated. Indeed, we characterize families of SCFs w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2740364