Conflicts with Momentum

Take the fort, then take city. In a two-stage, two-party contest, victory in initial stage can provide an advantage final stage. We examine such momentum conflict scenarios and investigate how valuable it must be to avoid Pyrrhic victory. Our main finding is that although elasticity of effort—which we allow vary between two stages—does impact contestants’ effort levels, has no bearing on endogenously determined value itself. Further, rent dissipation two-stage equal across party whether or not individual obtains first-stage momentum. Thus, helps player solely by enhancing marginal ability for second-stage contest. It does not, however, change player’s net calculus contest spending. Such contestable also found more rent-dissipative than innate/uncontestable advantage. Therefore, victories should common contests with intermediate stages which advantages earned, ceteris paribus. While targets appear as useful benchmarks, they dissipate additional expected rents. This toll exists even backward-inductive equilibrium behavior complete information setting. Whereas quagmire theory suggests parties become involved problematic conflicts due incomplete information, present paper finds setting conflict—namely, advantage—can alternatively generate tolls. Similarly, lead optimally forego participation (i.e., if parameters do meet constraint). contrast one-stage simultaneous parametric values