Conflicting Values and Moral Pluralism in Normative Ethics

Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics*

When making moral judgments, people are typically guided by a plurality of moral rules. These rules owe their existence to human emotions but are not simply equivalent to those emotions. And people’s moral judgments ought to be guided by a plurality of emotion-based rules. The view just stated combines three positions on moral judgment: [1] moral sentimentalism, which holds that sentiments play...

Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism in motion.

Reproductive tourism is the travelling by candidate service recipients from one institution, jurisdiction, or country where treatment is not available to another institution, jurisdiction, or country where they can obtain the kind of medically assisted reproduction they desire. The more widespread this phenomenon, the louder the call for international measures to stop these movements. Three pos...

Moral Intuition, Moral Theory, and Practical Ethics

Normative Pluralism in Indonesia: Regions, Religions, and Ethnicities

A number of prominent political theorists recently have tried to expand the reach of their approaches beyond Western liberalism and beyond Western democracies by critically examining notions of justice, multiculturalism, and what Parekh (2000) calls 'moral monism.' In his late writings, John Rawls (Rawls 1999) asked, albeit in a footnote, whether Islamic norms could enter into political debates...

On normative judgments and ethics

Recent rapid technological and medical advance has more than ever before brought to the fore a spectrum of problems broadly categorized under the umbrella of 'ethics of human enhancement'. Some of the most contentious issues are typified well by the arguments put forward in a recent article on human cognitive enhancement authored by Garasic and Lavazza. Herein I analyse some of the assumptions ...