منابع مشابه
Having reasons
What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the Factoring Account, you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have—which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the p...
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Since at least 1930, theorists working in moral philosophy and normativity more generally have recognized the importance of accounting for trade-offs in normative theories of what we ought to do.1 The most common way to do this is to appeal to contributory or pro tanto reasons. The thought is that the reasons for and against the options open to the agent interact and compete—in highly complex w...
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We explored the extent to which confabulators are susceptible to false recall and false recognition, and whether false recognition is reduced when memory for studied items is experimentally enhanced. Five confabulating patients, nine non-confabulating amnesics--including patients with (F amnesics) and without frontal-lobe dysfunction (NF amnesics)--and 14 control subjects underwent the DRM para...
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This article develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremem...
متن کاملBasic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons
This paper develops and defends a coherentist account of reasons. I develop three core ideas for this defense: a distinction between basic reasons and noninferential justification, the plausibility of the neglected argument against first philosophy, and an emergent account of reasons. These three ideas form the backbone for a credible coherentist view of reasons. I work toward this account by f...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Topoi
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0167-7411,1572-8749
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-09629-y