Condorcet vs. Borda in Light of a Dual Majoritarian Approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Restricted Manipulation in Iterative Voting: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Score
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we c...
متن کاملThe Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate that would be able to defeat each of the other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that it would elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule in three candi...
متن کاملgradual erasure of subjectivity: a study of samuel beckett’s trilogy in the light of postmodernism
ساموئل بکت بیشتر از هر نویسنده دیگری در نیم? دوم قرن بیستم با گفتارش زمان? ما را به آستان? از هم پاشیدگی کشانده است، آستانه ای که در آن مدرنیته با سرانجام گریزان اما غیرقابل اجتناب خود مواجه می شود. در این تحقیق روی مفهوم فردیت و محو آن در دوران پسامدرن تاکید شده و در طی آن سعی شده است که فردیت مدرن و پسامدرن در رمان های سه گانه بکت بررسی گردد. تحقیق حاضر یک بررسی کتابخانه ای و کیفی بر روی سه ر...
15 صفحه اولCondorcet and Borda in 1784. Misfits and Documents
This issue on the history of social mathematics is a fine occasion for promoting the digital library accumulated by the Bibliothèque nationale de France in Paris (www.gallica.fr) and for displaying beyond the circles of Condorcetian erudition the Condorcet-Borda file related to the mathematics of elections. The two names are well known. Their works, associated with the years 1781 (Borda) and 17...
متن کاملBorda, Condorcet, and Pareto optimality in ordinal group activity selection
We consider the situation in which group activities need to be organized for a set of agents. Each agent can take part in at most one activity, and the agents’ preferences depend both on the activity and the number of participants in that activity. In particular, the preferences are given by means of strict orders over such pairs “(activity, group size)”, including the possibility “do nothing”....
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1775927