Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate who would be able to defeat all other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting procedure is the conditional probability that it will elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. The study considers the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules (WSR’s) on three candidates for ...
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In an election, an alternative is said to be a strong Condorcet winner when more than 50% of the voters rank this alternative first in their preference orders. The strong Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is defined as the probability of electing the strong Condorcet winner, given that such an alternative exists. In this paper, we provide some analytical representations for the strong Condo...
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Condorcet winning sets are a set-valued generalization of the well-known concept of a Condorcet winner. As supersets of Condorcet winning sets are always Condorcet winning sets themselves, an interesting property of preference profiles is the size of the smallest Condorcet winning set they admit. This smallest size is called the Condorcet dimension of a preference profile. Since little is known...
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In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2001
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550000071