Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Condorcet choice functions and maximal elements
Choice functions on tournaments always select the maximal element (Condorcet winner), provided they exist, but this property does not hold in the more general case of weak tournaments. In this paper we analyze the relationship between the usual choice functions and the set of maximal elements in weak tournaments. We introduce choice functions selecting maximal elements, whenever they exist. Mor...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0312-0