Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation
We adopt an evolutionary approach to investigate whether and when conditional cooperation can explain the voluntary contribution phenomenon often observed in public goods experiments and in real life. Formally, conditional cooperation is captured by a regret parameter describing how much an individual regrets to contribute less than the average. We find that the evolutionary stability of condit...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.491