Computing Cournot equilibrium through maximization over prices

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Computing Cournot Equilibrium through Maximization over Prices∗

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters

سال: 2009

ISSN: 0165-1765

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.001