Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Verification
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Computing Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions with Continuous Value and Action Spaces
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are widely used in practice, which is why understanding their incentive properties is an important problem. However, finding Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNEs) of CAs analytically is tedious, and prior algorithmic work has only considered limited solution concepts (e.g. restricted action spaces). In this paper, we present a fast, general algorithm for computing symmetric ...
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We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or criticalprice payment rules, are used to resolve multiparameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show, for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes–Nash equilibria, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous bestresponse dynamics, that...
متن کاملUsing Simultaneous Best Response to Find Symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions
Finding Nash and Bayes-Nash equilibria in games is a hard problem both analytically and computationally. We restrict out attention to symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria in auctions and propose a computational method that takes advantage of the symmetry of equilibria and structure of auction games. The method is iterated best-response where all players move simultaneously. We present experimental r...
متن کاملUsing Iterated Best-Response to Find Bayes-Nash Equilibria in Auctions
Introduction Bayes-Nash equilibria (BNE) have been derived analytically only for the simplest auction settings (Krishna 2002). Such settings include single-item firstand second-price auctions with continuous distributions of bidders’ values1. Very little research has been devoted to auctions with discrete bids and values. We take some important first steps in this direction by computationally i...
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Competitive equilibrium provides a natural steady state for iterative combinatorial auctions that maximize social welfare, and therefore the first step in auction design is to establish its existence. Recent work by Baldwin and Klemperer (2012) has proved that the "demand type" of valuations being "unimodular" is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a competitive equilibriu...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.1.11525