Computational substrates of social norm enforcement by unaffected third parties

Computational substrates of social norm enforcement by unaffected third parties

Enforcement of social norms by impartial bystanders in the human species reveals a possibly unique capacity to sense and to enforce norms from a third party perspective. Such behavior, however, cannot be accounted by current computational models based on an egocentric notion of norms. Here, using a combination of model-based fMRI and third party punishment games, we show that brain regions prev...

Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because ...

Rule Enforcement with Third Parties in Secure Cooperative Data Access

In this paper, we consider the scenario where a set of parties need to cooperate with one another. To safely exchange the information, a set of authorization rules is given to the parties. In some cases, a trusted third party is required to perform the expected operations. Since interactions with the third party can be expensive and there maybe risk of data exposure/misuse, it is important to m...

Social norm enforcement in ethnically diverse communities

Recent waves of immigration to Western nations have fueled a debate over the consequences of ethnic diversity for social cohesion. One prominent argument in this debate holds that diversity is detrimental to trust and cooperation because individuals in heterogeneous communities face difficulties in enforcing social norms across ethnic lines. We examine this proposition in a field experiment inv...

Exploitable Results by Third Parties