Compulsory Voting Rules, Reluctant Voters and Ideological Proximity Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality
What difference does it make if the state makes people vote? The question is central to normative debates about the rights and duties of citizens in a democracy, and to contemporary policy debates in a variety of countries over what actions states should take to encourage electoral participation. By focusing on a rare case of abolishing compulsory voting in Venezuela, we show that not forcing p...
متن کاملRepublican Liberty and Compulsory Voting
This paper starts from four observations: (1) voter turnout is declining in established democracies; (2) low turnout means socio-economically unequal turnout; (3) compulsory voting is an effective means to increase turnout; (4) even low-turnout countries, however, have neither introduced nor even contemplated a legal obligation to vote. A closer look at the arguments against compulsory voting s...
متن کاملVoting power and proportional representation of voters
The paper provides a justification for the proportional representative (PR) election system for politically diversified societies. We employ the Shapley value concept to measure the political power of parties in a parliament. We prove that for the PR system if parties’ sizes are uniformly distributed on the simplex, the expected ratio of a party size to its political power increases to 1, and t...
متن کاملCompulsory Voting, Habit Formation, and Political Participation
Can compulsory voting induce lasting changes in citizens’ voting habits? We study the long-term and spillover effects of a severely sanctioned and long-standing compulsory voting law in the Swiss canton of Vaud (1900–1970). Our findings suggest that compulsory voting strongly increases turnout in federal referendums by about 30 percentage points. However, this effect returns to zero quickly aft...
متن کاملVoting by sequential elimination with few voters
We define a new class of low-communication voting rules, tailored for contexts with few voters and possibly many candidates. These rules are defined by a predefined sequence of voters: at each stage, the designated voter eliminates a candidate, and the last remaining candidate wins. We study deterministic and randomized versions of these rules. We first investigate their axiomatic properties. T...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Political Behavior
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0190-9320,1573-6687
DOI: 10.1007/s11109-018-9448-6