منابع مشابه
Security Limits for Compromising Emanations
Nearly half a century ago, military organizations introduced “Tempest” emission-security test standards to control information leakage from unintentional electromagnetic emanations of digital electronics. The nature of these emissions has changed with evolving technology; electromechanic devices have vanished and signal frequencies increased several orders of magnitude. Recently published eaves...
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Electronic equipment can emit unintentional signals from which eavesdroppers may reconstruct processed data at some distance. This has been a concern for military hardware for over half a century. The civilian computer-security community became aware of the risk through the work of van Eck in 1985. Military " Tempest " shielding test standards remain secret and no civilian equivalents are avail...
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Computer keyboards are often used to transmit confidential data such as passwords. Since they contain electronic components, keyboards eventually emit electromagnetic waves. These emanations could reveal sensitive information such as keystrokes. The technique generally used to detect compromising emanations is based on a wide-band receiver, tuned on a specific frequency. However, this method ma...
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The security problem of screen image leakage on a display unit through electromagnetic radiation from several meters away has attracted wide interest by security researchers since van Eck wrote about this problem. To solve the problem, techniques for reducing the S/N ratio of emanating information by signal reduction and noise generation have been proposed as countermeasures. Different from the...
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Side channel attacks exploit implementation-specific information leakage to defeat cryptographic measures, usually designed to provide confidentiality. The majority of published attacks require physical possession or network access to the target device, and as such are not suitable for implementation by an attacker wishing to carry out a remote, passive and undetectable attack. Surveillance tec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0018-9375,1558-187X
DOI: 10.1109/temc.2013.2252353