Compromising as an equal loss principle

A social choice rule aggregates the preferences of a group individuals over set alternatives into collective choice. The literature admits several rules whose recommendations are supposed to reflect compromise among individuals. We observe that all these can be better described as procedural compromises, i.e., they impose willingness but do not ensure an outcome where everyone has effectively compromised. revisit concept in environment with at least three having strict finite alternatives. Referring large class spread measures, we view from equal loss perspective, favoring every voter concedes equally possible. As such, being may fail Pareto efficiency, which by asking voters concede possible efficient show Condorcet consistent rules, scoring (except antiplurality) and Brams-Kilgour compromises fallback bargaining) ascertain is compromise. slight restriction on acceptable measures suffices extend negative result antiplurality bargaining. This failure also prevails for problems two individuals: well-known two-person literature, namely, bargaining, veto short listing rank, pick ex-post compromises. conclude there need propose study satisfy this loss, or oriented, notion