Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no specific attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multiwinner voting systems, under different formu...
متن کاملA broader picture of the complexity of strategic behavior in multi-winner elections
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elections of an assembly or committee; that work provided an initial understanding of the topic. In this paper, we paint a more complete picture of the topic, investigating four prominent multi-winner voting rules. First, ...
متن کاملMulti-Winner Elections: Complexity of Manipulation, Control and Winner-Determination
Although recent years have seen a surge of interest in the computational aspects of social choice, no attention has previously been devoted to elections with multiple winners, e.g., elections of an assembly or committee. In this paper, we fully characterize the worst-case complexity of manipulation and control in the context of four prominent multi-winner voting systems. Additionally, we show t...
متن کاملSample Complexity for Winner Prediction in Elections
Predicting the winner of an election is a favorite problem both for news media pundits and computational social choice theorists. Since it is often infeasible to elicit the preferences of all the voters in a typical prediction scenario, a common algorithm used for winner prediction is to run the election on a small sample of randomly chosen votes and output the winner as the prediction. We anal...
متن کاملStrategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve votin...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1076-9757
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2566