Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Complete information pivotal - voter model with asymmetric group size ∗
In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53].
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Public Choice
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0048-5829,1573-7101
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0585-6