Complementarity formulation of games with random payoffs
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract We consider an n -player non-cooperative game where the payoff function of each player follows a multivariate distribution. This formulation is adopted to model zonal electricity market in which generators operate by running conventional and renewable-based plants. The players compete as Cournot model. formulate this problem chance-constrained defining using chance constraint. A full empirical analysis has been conducted on Italian test impact renewable light decarbonization volatility cost plants, mainly related gas prices. finally robustness constraint with out sample analysis.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computational Management Science
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1619-6988', '1619-697X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-023-00467-x