منابع مشابه
Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration
Over the past century, collaborative work has become increasingly common in academia [61]. In the sciences, it has continued to spread as a practice across disciplines and countries [50, 51]. In fact, in most scientific fields, the majority of published work is now co-authored [40]. The social sciences, likewise, have seen an increase in collaborative work, particularly in fields like economics...
متن کاملBargaining and Destructive Power
The theory of bargaining as formulated by Nash (1950, 1953) has developed along two routes. One is axiomatic (e.g., Nash 1950; Kalai and Smorodinsky 1975; Roemer 1988). Here, the negotiation process underlying the bargaining is only implicit. The idea is to try to characterize the negotiated outcome (the solution) through a set of axioms without formally modeling the process. The advantages of ...
متن کاملBargaining power and equilibrium consumption
We examine how a shift of bargaining power within households operating in a competitive market environment affects equilibrium allocation and welfare. If price effects are sufficiently small, then typically an individual benefits from an increase of bargaining power, necessarily to the detriment of others. If price effects are drastic the welfare of all household members moves in the same direc...
متن کاملBuyer Size and Bargaining Power:
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) initiated a proceeding in 2002 to examine whether and to what extent cable operators should be limited in the number of subscribers they can serve. This paper reports on the performance of experimental (laboratory) markets designed to be similar in structure and practice to the market where cable operators negotiate affiliate fees with various program...
متن کاملBargaining Power and Contract Design
Over the past 40 years, an irrelevance proposition has been embraced implicitly in law-andeconomics scholarship: bargaining power should affect only price and not non-price terms of a contract. This proposition is based on unstated assumptions that contracting is affected by neither transaction costs nor asymmetrical information and that the parties are risk neutral. In contrast, practitioners ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Review of Agricultural Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0165-1587,1464-3618
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbx032