Competitive Search Equilibrium in a DSGE Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Money in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium∗
We compare three pricing mechanisms for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We do this in a framework that, in addition to considering different mechanisms, extends existing work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and endogenous entry. We study how...
متن کاملIncentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium∗
This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms and external search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocation of resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We find that private information may increase ...
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This paper extends the competitive search framework by relaxing the memory loss assumption the search literature imposes after a separation. Firms rehire available former employees instead of seeking new workers to economize on recruitment costs. Unemployed workers seek a new job conditional on their expectations on rehiring. Firms post step contracts to both optimally recruit and retain worker...
متن کاملCompetitive equilibrium with search frictions: A general equilibrium approach
When the trading process is characterized by search frictions, traders may be rationed so markets need not clear. We build a general equilibrium model with transferable utility where the uncertainty arising from rationing is incorporated in the definition of a commodity, in the spirit of the Arrow–Debreu theory. Prices of commodities then depend not only on their physical characteristics, but a...
متن کاملCompetitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium
We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and ef®ciency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1127252