Competitive pressure from neighboring markets and optimal privatization policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Japan and the World Economy
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0922-1425
DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2018.02.001