Competitive market equilibrium under asymmetric information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Decisions in Economics and Finance
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1593-8883,1129-6569
DOI: 10.1007/s10203-007-0073-9