Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study

Competitive Equilibrium with Middlemen: An Empirical Study

Middlemen in Search Equilibrium

This paper shows how including divisibility of goods and productive heterogeneity leads to the emergence of middlemen in an equilibrium search environment. In the baseline model, middlemen are welfare reducing and their number increases as market frictions are reduced. When the model is extended to allow for time taken in production and increasing returns-to-scale in the market meeting technolo...

Competitive Equilibrium with Indivisibilities

This paper studies an exchange economy with a nite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a nite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner. We provide an alternative de nition of the c...

Competitive equilibrium with indivisible objects∗

We study an exchange economy with indivisible objects that may not be substitutes for each other, and we introduce the p-substitutability condition, a relaxation of the gross substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982), in which a parameter vector p is adopted to permit complicated types of complementarity. We prove that for any economy E, there exists a corresponding vector pE such that...

Competitive Search Equilibrium with Rehiring

This paper extends the competitive search framework by relaxing the memory loss assumption the search literature imposes after a separation. Firms rehire available former employees instead of seeking new workers to economize on recruitment costs. Unemployed workers seek a new job conditional on their expectations on rehiring. Firms post step contracts to both optimally recruit and retain worker...