Competition yields efficiency in load balancing games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Competition yields efficiency in load balancing games
We study a nonatomic congestion game with N parallel links, with each link under the control of a profit maximizing provider. Within this ‘load balancing game’, each provider has the freedom to set a price, or toll, for access to the link and seeks to maximize its own profit. Given prices, a Wardrop equilibrium among users is assumed, under which users all choose paths ofminimal and identical e...
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In load balancing games, there is a set of available servers and a set of clients; each client wishes to run her job on some server. Clients are selfish and each of them selects a server that, given an assignment of the other clients to servers, minimizes the latency she experiences with no regard to the global optimum. In order to mitigate the effect of selfishness on the efficiency, we assign...
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We analyze the Pareto efficiency, or inefficiency, of solutions to routing games and load balancing games, focusing on Nash equilibria and greedy solutions to these games. For some settings, we show that the solutions are necessarily Pareto optimal. When this is not the case, we provide a measure to quantify the distance of the solution from Pareto efficiency. Using this measure, we provide upp...
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Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for all players. Mediated equilibria have more power to achieve outcomes with high social welfare than Nash or correlated equilibria, but less power than a fully centralized authority. Here we begin the study of the powe...
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In this paper, we study two models of resource allocation games: the classical load balancing game and its new variant involving resource activation costs. The resources we consider are identical and the social costs of the games are utilitarian, which are the average of all individual players’ costs. Using the social costs we assess the quality of pure Nash equilibria in terms of the price of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Performance Evaluation
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0166-5316
DOI: 10.1016/j.peva.2011.07.005